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David S. Alberts (OASD-NII – DoD CIO, USA)
Mark E. Nissen (US Naval Postgraduate School, USA)
Abstract
A variety of  academic disciplines and professional organizations address 
how collections of  individuals and organizations combine their individual 
resources and efforts to accomplish collective objectives. However, these 
largely disjointed communities of  researchers and practitioners have each 
developed their own concepts, models and languages. Moreover, they 
focus on different yet complementary issues, levels of  analysis, and sets 
of  variables. Addressing recent calls in the literature for increased seman-
tic interoperability and interaction across these communities, we build 
upon current work to develop a metaphorical Rosetta Stone. The device 
we construct to interrelate concepts and variables across domains is in 
the form of  a common approach space. We show how a variety of  C2 
Approaches and organizational archetypes can be examined—together—
within a concise set of  three dimensions. We also illustrate how diverse 
archetypes can be visualized—together—in terms of  this same, three-
dimensional model. This represents a substantial theoretical contribution 
to both the C2 and OMT domains, and it serves to bridge these domains 
in ways that can stimulate and facilitate mutually informed, cross-
domain research.
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Introduction
A variety of  academic disciplines (e.g., Economics, Organization 
Studies, Sociology) and professional organizations (e.g., militaries, 
governments, corporations, voluntary organizations) address how 
collections of  individuals and organizations combine their individ-
ual resources and efforts to accomplish collective objectives. These 
largely disjointed communities of  researchers and practitioners have 
developed their own concepts, models and languages. Moreover, 
they focus on different yet complementary issues, levels of  analysis, 
and sets of  variables. In the language of  command and control (C2) 
Maturity, these communities are Conflicted: the “whole” of  their col-
lective works remains far less than the (potential) sum of  the parts 
(SAS-065 2008).
In the inaugural issue of  the International C2 Journal (CCRP 2007), two 
papers took aim at this lack of  semantic interoperability and the gen-
eral failure to draw upon relevant work in related fields. This behav-
ior is clearly not consistent with the cumulative knowledge-building 
tradition of  science. The first of  these papers (Alberts 2007) articu-
lates a need to move beyond the very term command and control and 
the baggage of  implicit assumptions and settled practice by adopting 
new terms and focusing on the functions associated with C2. The 
focus is not on how these functions have come to be approached or 
accomplished. The second of  these papers (Nissen 2007) documents 
the mutual failure of  the C2 research and professional communities, 
and a variety of  related disciplines, to draw upon a more complete 
body of  relevant works that could have resulted in a stronger intel-
lectual foundation with an integrated set of  empirical evidence to 
support both theory and practice. These two papers bridge initiated 
efforts to focus on the domains of  command and control and con-
tingency theory.
The research described here builds upon the prior work by devel-
oping multidisciplinary formulations of  the C2 Approach Space 
and the concept C2 Maturity. It draws principally from, and works 
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to integrate, concepts and relationships from two domains of  
knowledge: 1) Command and Control, and 2) Organization and 
Management Theory (OMT). These two domains offer a very clear 
opportunity for productive linkage, since a great many of  the activi-
ties associated with commanding and controlling pertain to organiz-
ing and managing and vice versa.
Further, we see clear theoretical advances that can be made through 
research along these lines. For instance, there is no single, “best” 
way to command and control or to organize and manage. While 
this axiom is well-understood in OMT, and has great applicability to 
C2, it is not as widely understood in the C2 community. Work along 
these lines can help to fill the current knowledge gap in this regard. 
For another instance, many organizations have the capability to 
change and hence to command and control or to organize and man-
age differently in response to varying mission-environmental condi-
tions. Theoretical concepts and relationships from the C2 domain 
can inform this phenomenon in the OMT domain in novel ways 
and vice versa. Such mutual informing represents another theoreti-
cal advance that we hope to effect through this work.
Building upon a stream of  research in both domains, the article begins 
by summarizing the key concepts and variables in each domain and 
uses the increasingly well-understood contrast between hierarchical 
and edge approaches to C2 and the corresponding organization and 
management structures to give those concepts and variables concrete 
application. We then develop a metaphorical Rosetta Stone, in the 
form of  a common approach space, adapted from the C2 Approach 
Space (Alberts and Hayes 2006), and the concept of  C2 Maturity, 
adapted from the NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model (SAS-065 2008), 
to interrelate those concepts and variables across domains. This work 
should contribute to a continuing process of  integrating researchers, 
practitioners, and policy makers from these two domains and pro-
vides a foundation to support extending beyond these two domains.
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Key Concepts and Relationships
In this section we summarize the key concepts and variables in 
the C2 and OMT domains. This provides the conceptual grist for 
discussion.
Command and Control
There is a substantial body of  literature that addresses Command 
and Control. This body of  literature is quite diverse and includes 
works that address theory, models, analyses, practice, case studies, 
lessons learned, and more recently C2-related experiments. While 
elements of  this literature date back thousands of  years, the portion 
of  the literature that could be characterized as scientific has emerged 
much more recently. This more recent literature is a reflection of  
the concepts and technologies that have defined the Industrial and 
Information Ages. Each of  these ages has left its distinctive marks on 
the way C2 is conceptualized and practiced. Given that the field of  
C2 is currently in the midst of  a transformation, one that is chang-
ing the set of  underlying assumptions, variables of  interest, and the 
relationships between and among these variables, the nature of  this 
evolution is briefly discussed before we take a look at the variables 
that serve to characterize C2 Approaches and organization.
Evolution in Thinking about Command and Control1
The term command and control is clearly a product of  the Industrial Age. 
The first use of  the term as we understand it appears to be by Jomini 
(Henri de Jomini, 1838) in The Art of  War, when he entitles a section 
of  the book, “The Command of  Armies and the Supreme Control 
1. This discussion of  C2 evolution draws heavily from a peer review draft of  
the NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model (SAS-065 2008) and the related works of  
Hayes, R. E. 
 ALBERTS & NISSEN | Toward Harmonizing C2 with OMT       5
of  Operations.” It emerges as a term of  art around the middle of  the 
last century when President Truman instructs General MacArthur to 
“take command and control of  the forces” (MacArthur 1964). Prior 
to this command was always associated with an individual (a com-
mander) and a headquarters (a management team). Even the idea 
of  a formal staff  does not emerge before Gutaavus Adophus (1594-
1632) and modern staff  structures not until Napoleon Bonaparte 
(Alberts and Hayes 2007, Ch. 3). Since the concept of  command 
was traditionally anthropomorphized, the term command became 
associated with the authority vested in a commander. Hence the 
study of  command involved how particular commanders exercised 
this authority.
Many official definitions continue to be focused on the authorities 
associated with command, not on what needs to be accomplished 
and how it could or should be accomplished (Alberts and Hayes 
1995, 5-6; Alberts and Hayes 2006, Ch. 4; NATO 2008; NATO 
n.d.). Since the term command has become “personalized,” each com-
mander is expected to have an individual style, which is a reflection 
(an instance) of  the art of  command. This approach to command 
fits well with the hierarchical nature of  military organizations both 
in the Industrial Age and in prior ages, when commanders were 
often royal or political figures representing or being an embodiment 
of  the state.
This “commander-centric” view of  what is after all a set of  func-
tions required for mission success is totally antithetical to the way in 
which these functions need to be accomplished in many of  the 21st 
century missions that militaries are being called upon to undertake. 
These missions are being referred to as Complex Endeavors to distin-
guish them from traditional military operations. The term Complex 
Endeavors (Alberts and Hayes 2007) refers to undertakings that have 
one or more of  the following characteristics:
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1. The number and diversity of  the participants is such that
a. There are multiple interdependent “chains of  command,”
b. The objective functions of  the participants conflict with one 
another or their components have significantly different 
weights, or
c. The participants’ perceptions of  the situation differ in impor-
tant ways; and
2. The effects space spans multiple domains and there is
a. A lack of  understanding of  networked cause and effect rela-
tionships, and
b. An inability to predict effects that are likely to arise from 
alternative courses of  action.
These civil-military endeavors are necessary because no single entity 
has the wherewithal to succeed. For a variety of  reasons no single 
entity will be “in command.” Hence, a commander-centric view 
makes no sense.
This reality and the opportunities provided by Information Age con-
cepts and technologies have stimulated calls to rethink C2 (Alberts 
2007). Rethinking C2 does not mean discarding everything we have 
learned. On the contrary, it means revisiting assumptions and build-
ing upon what remains valid. Without competent C2, military oper-
ations would never have succeeded in the past, particularly the very 
large operations that have been undertaken.
Modern C2 organizations trace their origins to Napoleon, who is 
credited with development of  the first modern military headquar-
ters and the associated creation of  a “modern” command staff  
(Alberts and Hayes 2007). At this point in time, the functioning of  
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a command staff  became a subject of  analysis. Different militaries 
had different approaches to headquarters organization and corre-
spondingly different approaches to the way in which commander’s 
intent was expressed and control was exercised (Alberts and Hayes 
1995).
It was not until the middle of  the century, following Napoleon’s staff  
innovations, that the term command and control began to be widely 
used. This raised the question of  what the additional term control 
meant. Several explanations have been provided. One view main-
tains that command refers to what a commander does and control 
is associated with how the “will” of  the commander becomes trans-
lated into instructions and promulgated throughout forces by the 
command staff  (Bolger 1990). Another view parses “the art and sci-
ence of  command and control”: command is the art, and control 
is the science (Schoffner 1993, 1, 31-35). The control (or scientific) 
aspect of  C2 fit well into an Industrial Age perspective that assumed 
that organizations and situations could be adequately represented 
as machines, albeit complicated machines. Given that a machine 
behaves according to a knowable set of  rules, results could be con-
trolled scientifically.
This has resulted in, until very recently, a bifurcation of  inquiry where 
the study of  commanders and their behaviors continued to be a sub-
ject for military historians and the study of  control became fair game 
for a variety of  scientific disciplines. Two disciplines dominated this 
academic space. The first was, as seems fitting, Control Theory and 
the related field of  Cybernetics. The second was Decision Making.
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A fundamental property of  Control Theory is the feedback loop. 
Boyd (1976-1992) is most frequently cited for his “OODA” loop2 3 
which depicts the C2 functions of  observe, orient, decide, and act as con-
stituting a continuous feedback process. Other examples of  the way 
the C2 problem was formulated in Control Theory can be found 
in the classic work by Lawson (1979; 1980), Wohl (1981), Levis and 
Athans (1987); and the development of  HEAT (the Headquarters 
Effectiveness Assessment Tool; HEAT 1984) and its army counter-
part—Army Command and Control Evaluation System (Hayes, 
Layton, Ross, and Girdler 1990).
All these specific approaches evolved from work reported to or build-
ing on a significant symposium organized by the Joint Directors of  
Laboratories in 1989. In essence, they decompose the military pro-
cess into steps required for controlling a battlespace—monitoring 
the situation, developing situational awareness, developing courses 
of  action, decision making that selects among the courses of  action, 
developing and promulgating guidance to implement those deci-
sions, and establishing mechanisms for feedback that allow the cycle 
to be continuous by monitoring the situation during implementa-
tion. They also posit that the purpose of  C2 is to (a) reduce uncer-
tainty and (b) gain control over specific parts of  the situation (e.g., 
casualty ratios, key terrain, others). These approaches proved effec-
tive when examining Industrial Age Conflicts where situations could 
be decomposed into manageable arenas (e.g., intelligence, logistics, 
and planning) and where those situations had enough manageable 
parameters that they could be addressed as relatively closed, engi-
neering type problems.
2. John Boyd’s body of  work was largely documented in the form of  
presentations. Osinga (2007) reports that the OODA loop while described 
in words on a number of  occasions appear only once as a graphic which he 
reproduces on p. 231 of  his book on Boyd.
3. John Boyd’s work beyond the OODA loop (which has been dismissed as being 
too simplistic) is relatively little known. His contributions have been documented 
in biographies by Hammond (2001) and Coram (2002) and are summarized in a 
book by Osinga (2007).
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While the existence of  uncertainty (e.g., the metaphorical fog of  war) 
is an obvious given, the approaches one takes to cope with uncer-
tainty can differ. Focusing solely on reducing uncertainty (e.g., by 
increasing sensors capabilities and correspondingly increasing the 
capability to communicate sensor reports) has its limits. There will 
always be a significant amount of  irreducible uncertainty remain-
ing. Van Crevald (1985) recognizes this and argues that when “con-
fronted with a task, and having less information available than is 
necessary to perform the task, an organization may…design the 
organization, and indeed the task itself, in such a way as to enable it 
to operate on the basis of  less information.”4
Examples of  how decision making was seen as the key to studying C2 
include the work of  Janis on groupthink (Janis 1982), Klein on recog-
nition primed decision making (Klein 1998) and naturalistic decision 
making (Klein and Salas 2001), and Weick on sensemaking (Weick 
and Sutcliffe 2001). Sensemaking (making sense of  the situation) is 
a set of  cognitive processes that begins when awareness reaches a 
certain level and ends with a formulation of  intent (a decision to 
act).5 Thus, sensemaking is a bridge between developing awareness 
and acting. Military-related human factors research, Endsley (1988, 
1989, 1990) and Bolstad and Endsley (1999) for example, have tra-
ditionally been focused on understanding and improving individual 
and small team situation awareness in a tactical context. However, 
the definition of  situation awareness includes what others refer to 
as knowledge and understanding. Furthermore, this body of  work 
4. This quote is part of  a larger discussion and the organizational-task design 
suggestion is an alternative to increasing information-processing capability. See 
Van Crevald (1985, 251-60).
5. A comprehensive discussion of  the variables related to the analysis of  
Information Age warfare in the physical, information, and cognitive domains 
(the cognitive domain in this treatment included variables that later became 
referred to as the social domain) including awareness, and understanding and 
shared awareness and shared understanding as part of  an evolving sensemaking 
process can be found in Alberts et al. Understanding Information Age 
Warfare (2001).
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seems to imply that there is in fact a single version of  ground truth 
and hence makes its extension to a coalition environment problem-
atic. This focus on decision making can also be found in the works 
of  theorists who see command as the key issue such as Allard (1995) 
and Pigeau and McCann (2002).
These approaches emphasize the nature of  the decisions being made 
and the individuals making them. They place the burden on under-
standing how people make decisions (e.g., from cognitive psychology 
to theories of  learning and knowledge) and the limits of  individual 
cognition. Unfortunately, this school of  thought focuses analyses of  
C2 inward on the processes and people involved. Like control the-
ory, these approaches should not be ignored. They represent a part 
of  the understanding needed to analyze C2. However, Complex 
Endeavors require a larger perspective and a broader understanding 
of  what is needed for C2 to be successful.
During the latter part of  the 20th century, technology became an 
increasingly important consideration. Communications technology 
became so important that the term C2 became C3 for Command, 
Control, and Communications. The Information Age dawned, and 
with it the term evolved further to C3I (the “I” for Intelligence) and 
again to C4I (the fourth “C” being Computers). The study of  C2 
evolved along with the language. There was an increasing emphasis 
put on communications-related metrics such as the probability of  
correct message receipt (Perry, Signori, and Boon 2003) and mea-
sures of  information throughput (HEAT 1984). The focus of  research 
during this period moved from a preoccupation with a commander 
to a preoccupation with C2 (C3, C3I, C4I) systems. Unfortunately, 
the C2 systems and engineering communities remain preoccupied 
with C2 systems. Fortunately there are significant activities emerg-
ing in other communities. For example, there is important attention 
now being focused on team, group, and collective behaviors related 
to accomplishing the functions associated with C2.
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Despite this emerging focus on collective behaviors, the bulk of  
research and analysis of  C2 systems has and continues to be “com-
mander-centric” and focuses on the related decision making pro-
cesses. In the Industrial Age, command was all about the commander. 
In the Information Age the emphasis shifted to technical systems. 
However, these systems continued to be conceived, designed, and 
operated as essentially vertical pipes of  information  that centered 
primarily on a commander or the command staff.6 The only decisions 
considered worthy of  attention are those made by a commander 
or the command staff. This view keeps the tradition of  the “art of  
command” and a “commander-centric” view in place, driving how 
communications and information systems and C2 processes are con-
ceived and studied.
21st century mission challenges in the form of  Complex Endeavors 
and the continued maturation of  networking (e.g., social, communi-
cations, information) concepts, technologies, and services combined 
have to create a schism between the ways in which C2 was and, for 
the most part, still is conceptualized, studied, and practiced and what 
is required for success. This disconnect is not limited to the military. 
Networking capabilities have not only fundamentally changed the 
economics of  information (Alberts, Garstka, and Stein 1999), but 
they have also changed the way individuals and organizations relate 
to one another throughout society.
The idea that military institutions in general and C2 in particular 
should co-evolve with advances in information technologies (Alberts, 
Garstka, Hayes, and Signori 2001) was central to a new theory of  
warfare, Network Centric Warfare (NCW), as it was coined in the United 
States (Alberts et al. 1999; DoD 2001b). NCW suggested a new rela-
tionship between those in positions of  command and those respon-
sible for the large variety of  functions that need to be accomplished 
in military operations. As a consequence, ideas that foreshadowed 
6. Once a commander made a decision, information in the form of  orders or 
plans would be communicated to subordinates.
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the conceptualization of  NCW, such as information being “freed 
from the chain of  command” (Alberts 1996, 15-20, 33-40; Alberts 
and Hayes 2003), and questions that challenged the existence of  a 
single chain of  command (Mauer 1994; Allard 1995; M. Hayes and 
Wheatley 1996; Alberts and Hayes 1995), set the stage for the linch-
pin of  NCW, self-synchronization (Alberts et al. 1999; Alberts et al. 
2001).
A further step in the process of  making the study of  C2 less per-
sonalized was the change in the term commander’s intent to command 
intent (Alberts and Hayes 2006). This change highlighted both the 
fact that there are many decision makers (cf., commanders only) in 
any battlespace or Complex Endeavor and the fact that no single 
person is in charge or in command during Complex Endeavors (R. 
E. Hayes 2007).
While NCW suggested a new way of  looking at how to accomplish 
the functions associated with C2, many chose to ignore this “sugges-
tion” and chose to focus instead on providing the information infra-
structure to support network centric operations, thereby ignoring the 
need to explore new approaches to C2. The term NEC, Network 
Enabled Capability, adopted by NATO and several countries, effec-
tively encourages an emphasis on the development of  “kit” rather 
than the exploration of  new approaches to accomplishing the func-
tions associated with C2.
The lack of  attention to the co-evolution of  cognitive and social pro-
cesses is the aftermath of  the introduction of  NCW and demanded 
a response. The articulation of  a set of  Power to the Edge principles 
and related policies (DoD 2003) was such a response. Power to the Edge 
directly addresses the seismic shift in relationships required to lever-
age shared awareness to foster self-synchronization and achieve dra-
matic improvements in mission effectiveness. Power to the Edge thus 
explains what NCW left to the imagination, that is, the “magic” that 
connects the links in the network-centric value chain (Alberts and 
Hayes 2003).
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From both a theoretical and an analytical point of  view, the emer-
gence of  NCW and Power to the Edge served to focus attention on 
a new set of  independent variables, including but not limited to 
those variables that specify a particular approach to C2 (Alberts and 
Hayes 2006; Alberts and Hayes 2007). The idea of  a C2 Approach 
Space that includes non-traditional approaches to military organi-
zation is quite revolutionary. It clearly moves C2 organization and 
doctrine from an assumption to a treatment in the experimentation 
sense. Without this shift in the conceptual framework, there would 
be no feasible solution to the problem of  civil-military coalition C2 
































C2 Approach Space (adapted from Alberts and Hayes 2006)
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The three dimensional approach space depicted in Figure 1 can 
be used to describe a wide variety of  approaches to accomplishing 
the functions associated with C2 for a diverse set of  teams, organi-
zations, or collectives of  entities. The three dimensions that form 
the C2 Approach Space, while graphically depicted as orthogonal, 
are, in fact, interrelated. The allocation of  decision rights (ADR) 
considered from either the perceptive of  a single organization or a 
collection of  entities establishes a set of  constraints and influences 
that impacts the other two dimensions. The end points of  ADR are 
“none” and “broad,” indicating no delegations of  authority and 
that authorities are widely distributed. The closer to “none” that 
an organization falls on this scale, the greater the likelihood that the 
patterns of  interaction (PoI) and distribution of  information (DoI) 
will be constrained.
The area around the origin corresponds to traditional military C2 
and organization, while the opposite corner of  this space corre-
sponds to what has become known as “edge organizations” (Alberts 
and Hayes 2003). The language used to refer to each of  the three 
dimensions as well as their respective end points needs to be tai-
lored to the application. For example, in the case of  an organization 
with well-established and very limited delegations of  authorities, 
the ADR (within the organization) can be thought of  in terms of  
a centralized-decentralized continuum. In the case of  a collective 
of  disparate entities (e.g., as in the “self ” of  a Complex Endeavor), 
the ADR dimension has been labeled as the “allocation of  decision 
rights to the collective,” where “none” indicates that each individual 
entity maintains whatever decision rights it has, and “broad” indi-
cates that entities are willing to give up significant sovereignty.
The PoI dimension spans a continuum from “highly constrained” to 
“unconstrained,” while the DoI dimension spans a spectrum from 
“none” to “broad.” In practice, individuals in organizations that 
control information tightly will only have access to what is thought 
to be of  interest to them a priori. Thus, available information will 
not be widely dispersed. Individuals in organizations that facilitate 
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and encourage widespread sharing of  information will, on the other 
hand, have access to more of  the available information. If  and how 
well they utilize this additional access to information depends on a 
great many other factors.
Another development has contributed to the reconceptualization of  
C2. This development strikes at the assumption that one can opti-
mize C2 or C2 Approach. One cannot and should not think about 
“optimizing” C2 in the 21st century. There is no single approach, 
no best system design or configuration, no best process for all situa-
tions and circumstances. Military planners cannot adequately pre-
dict the exact nature of  21st century missions. However, there is 
one certainty. Those missions are more likely to involve Complex 
Endeavors characterized by complexity in the environment and the 
effects space, and the complexity inherent in the collective (nature 
of  the set of  entities needed to respond) (Alberts and Hayes 2006).
Thus, rather than trying to optimize, one needs to focus on agility , 
where agility is the capability to maintain effectiveness in the face 
of  changing circumstances and a variety of  stresses (Alberts 2007).7 
To engineers and analysts this development creates both a funda-
mental challenge and an opportunity. The challenge is to rethink 
an approach and process that assumes a level of  understanding 
that simply is not present in most relevant efforts. The fundamental 
changes in the way we need to think about C2 call into question 
the very language we have used to talk about C2 and, in fact, the 
term itself.
7. Agility is discussed in more detail in the section on Key Command and 
Control Variables.
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C2 in Context of  a Complex Endeavor (Collective)8
C2, until quite recently, has been associated with a single organiza-
tion or with coalitions that try to act as if  they were a single orga-
nization. Complex Endeavors involve collections of  entities that 
clearly do not want to be or act like a single entity. Hence, there is 
a need to also address the collective itself, rather than just the indi-
vidual entities that make up the collective. However, a collective is 
fractal in nature. That is, there is an entity structure9 that needs to 
be described and understood at each of  a number of  different scales. 
This is illustrated in Figure 2 where the basic structure consists of  
entities linked to each other through their interactions. Both the 
basic structures and the nature of  interactions can be qualitatively 
different across entities as a function of  scale. As an example of  the 
differences at the various entity levels, we might consider teams (e.g., 
military units), organizations (e.g., military and civilian), and collec-











Fractal Nature of  Entities with Qualitatively Different 
Interactions10
8. This section draws heavily from the peer review draft of  the NATO NEC 
C2 Maturity Model (SAS-065 2008; the lead authors were Moffat, J. and 
Alberts, D.). 
9. It is the idea of  entities comprised of  other entities that makes this fractal 
in nature, even if  these constituent entities may be, in fact, very different in 
structure. This is because we are looking at inter-entity relationships and 
behaviors.
10. Adapted from SAS-065 2008; this figure was conceived by James Moffat.
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Team – Multiple people work together with high levels of  
common intent towards a common objective. They train 
together and develop a common work culture. The team typ-
ically consists of  a leader and followers who fully understand 
each other’s competencies, authorities, and responsibilities.
Organization – Multiple teams bound by a common vision, a 
common mission, core values, monetary incentives (typically), 
business rules, legislation, policy, well-established communi-
cation and interaction, and some degree of  common shared 
intent required to achieve the mission and realize the vision.
Collective – Multiple loosely-coupled organizations that might 
work together if  in their best interest, or sometimes for the 
greater good or a collective purpose. Note that the links may 
be less robust with less of  a central tendency than in teams or 
organizations. The organizations that make up the collective 
each bring specific and complementary capabilities. They 
may also have different intents as well as exhibit different 
C2 Maturity levels. A collective matures more by adaptation 
(given enough time working together) and less by deliberate 
design (legislation, policy, and training).
Key Command and Control Variables
As the thinking about C2 has evolved over time, so have the variables 
that have captured the attention of  C2 researchers and analysts. The 
interest in the quantitative assessment of  C2 became increasingly 
fashionable in the 1970s. By 1979 the Office of  the Secretary of  
Defense organized, at the National Defense University, a conference 
and workshop to review the state of  the art and signal an interest 
in improved C2 analysis (DoD 1980). The sponsors, the Director, 
Net Assessment, and the Assistant Secretary of  Defense (C3I), both 
desired to better understand and improve C2 organizations, capa-
bilities, equipment, and reduce vulnerabilities. They were therefore 
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interested in measuring the utility of  communications, intelligence, 
warning, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other support functions 
for the purposes of  C2 force trade-offs and planning and budging 
priorities.
The independent variables used at this time and for years to come 
were related to 1) systems performance, 2) measures of  information 
quality, and 3) measures related to decision quality. The contribu-
tions of  C2 to mission effectiveness were considered to be bound 
by assumptions of  perfect communications and perfect and timely 
information. Virtually all of  the effort in analyses and in C2 invest-
ments were made to improve the systems that supported C2, not 
C2 itself.
This continued well into the 1990s, when a more sophisticated value 
chain was introduced along with the concept of  network centric war-
fare. This value chain was presented in the form of  a set of  tenets 
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The Network Centric Value Chain begins with a robustly networked 
force, which increases information sharing. Information sharing 
improves both the quality of  information and shared awareness. 
Shared awareness enables self-synchronization and improves mis-
sion effectiveness. This focuses attention on a set of  intermediate 
key variables that explain why moving to a more connected force 
(e.g., why investments in communications and information pro-
cessing capabilities) leads to improved mission effectiveness. At the 
same time a new mental model of  C2 was introduced that provided 
additional context and granularity. This mental model placed the 
Network Centric Value Chain in the context of  the physical, infor-
mation, cognitive, and social domains (see Figure 3) (Alberts et al. 
2001, 71-76).
While NCW created a stir when it was introduced, it did not funda-
mentally change the basic assumption associated with military C2, 
that of  a chain of  command. However, it did argue for rethinking 
the allocation of  decision rights and the way commander’s intent 
could be expressed.
The next fundamental change occurred, not to the set of  indepen-
dent variables but to the set of  dependent variables. At this point 
success was synonymous with improvements in mission effectiveness, 
as defined by a set of  planning scenarios. Given the uncertainty asso-
ciated with the next security or mission challenge, both as to the 
nature of  the situation that could arise and the nature of  the coalition 
needed to meet this challenge, the specification of  a set of  scenarios 
to frame an optimization problem became itself  problematic. The 
nature of  scenario-based analysis problems are compounded when 
one is required to consider all of  the things that could go wrong or 
not according to plan. Mission effectiveness turns out to be nice in 
theory but impractical to use in practice given the uncertainties asso-
ciated with the mission space and mission performance.
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A better approach has been suggested. Rather than focus on mission 
effectiveness, which requires a specific scenario, it has been suggested 
that one focus instead on agility. Agility is the ability to successfully 
cope with a variety of  circumstances and stresses.11 Threats to suc-
cessfully coping can come from a variety of  sources. The six com-
ponents of  agility are: 1) robustness, 2) flexibility, 3) responsiveness, 
4) resilience, 5) adaptability, and 6) innovation (Alberts and Hayes 
2003). Thus, this set of  variables has been added to the growing list 
of  variables of  concerns important to C2 researchers and analysts.
C2 Approaches
Five archetypical C2 Approaches have been defined and mapped 
to different regions of  the C2 Approach Space. These five include: 
1) Conflicted C2, 2) De-Conflicted C2, 3) Coordinated C2, 4) 
Collaborative C2, and 5) Edge C2. Figure 4 depicts how these arche-
typical C2 Approaches are mapped to the axes of  the approach space. 
Note that the boundaries between C2 Approaches depicted in this 
figure (e.g., the place where De-Conflicted becomes coordinated) are 
fuzzy and not delineated sharply. We use this graphic device to con-
vey approximate relations between the C2 Approaches and dimen-
sional axes, so as not to imply precise definition or measurement.
11. The CCRP sponsors a monthly meeting of  interested researchers and 
analysts that is devoted to discussions of  issues related to agility, focus, and 
convergence. This group reached this consensus one-line definition of  agility.
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C2 Approach Space Dimensions (adapted from 
SAS-065 2008)
Figure 5 creates a three dimensional view of  the C2 Approach 
Space and plots the five C2 Approaches according to the three axes 
depicted above.12 Point A corresponds to Conflicted C2 and occu-
pies an extreme point on the lower left frontal corner of  the space 
(i.e., no allocation of  decision rights, no distribution of  informa-
tion, and no interaction). Notice the progression of  C2 Approaches 
depicted in the figure across a rough diagonal from Point A to Point 
H; that is, as the C2 Approach progresses from Conflicted through 
De-Conflicted, Coordinated and Collaborative to Edge C2, their 
12. It should be noted that the NATO study was done specifically in the 
context of  Collective C2, that is, the arrangements and behaviors that are 
associated with C2 from and the perspective of  the collective. It was assumed 
that different entities would each have their own C2-related capabilities and 
internal approaches to C2, or in the case of  non-military organizations, their 
own organizational structures and approaches to management. What the NATO 
group focused on was how these independent (and interdependent) entities 
worked collectively. Thus, the definitions of  the three axes of  the Approach 
Space were cast in this context. For example, with respect to the allocation of  
decision rights (none to broad), what was considered was the extent to which 
these rights were allocated or delegated to the Collective; for the patterns of  
interaction (none to broad), the patterns of  interest were between and among the 
entities; and, for the distribution of  information (none to broad), the perspective 
was how information was distributed across entities.
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corresponding positions in the C2 Approach Space shift from the 
lower-bottom-left to the upper-top-right corners of  the space (i.e., 
broad allocation of  decision rights, broad distribution of  informa-
tion, and unconstrained patterns of  interaction).
The reader will note that Figure 5 depicts no overlaps between the 
approaches (i.e., each approach occupies a distinct region of  the 
space). The fuzziness between the boundaries in Figure 4 is not 
meant to imply overlaps but rather that the exact positioning of  the 
break points between one approach and another on these axes is not 
definitively known at this point in time.13
13. Notice also most C2 Approaches are depicted in the figure as rectanguloid 
volumes instead of  points. This represents the approximate relations between 
the C2 Approaches and dimensional axes noted above. Finally, notice that most 
vertices (e.g., labeled “B,” “C,” “D,” and so forth) do not have C2 Approaches 
associated with them. Indeed, the five C2 Approaches represented in this figure 
occupy a relatively small volume of  the approach space. This suggests that the 
number and positioning of  feasible C2 Approaches may be relatively small, 
but exploring the nature, feasibility, and comparative performance of  alternate 
approaches (e.g., represented by moving from the diagonal toward Points B,C,F, 
and G) represents an intriguing avenue for future research.
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Figure 5. 
Patterns of Interaction



















The ability of  an organization or a collective to progress in its C2 
ability from the lower-bottom-left of  the C2 Approach Space (i.e., 
Conflicted C2) to the upper-top-right (i.e., Edge C2) is related to 
the concept C2 Maturity, a concept which emerged recently in the 
C2 research literature (SAS-065 2008). As an organization becomes 
capable of  operating farther and farther along this diagonal, it devel-
ops the ability to operate across a larger volume of  the C2 Space. 
For instance, an organization capable of  Coordinated C2 could 
also implement either De-Conflicted or Conflicted if  it chooses to; 
likewise, an organization capable of  Collaborative C2 could also 
implement Coordinated, De-Conflicted or Conflicted, and an orga-
nization capable of  Edge C2 could implement any approach. The 
interested reader is referred to (SAS-065 2008) for details.
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Thus, the five archetypical C2 Approaches serve as the basic build-
ing blocks of  C2 Maturity. However, simply being able to adopt a 
greater variety of  C2 Approaches is not sufficient; C2 Maturity also 
implies knowing which approach is appropriate to the situation and 
an ability to transition from one C2 Approach to another in a timely 
fashion. Therefore, different levels of  C2 Maturity can be described 
in terms of  the range of  C2 Approaches that an organization can 
appropriately adopt.
Organization and Management Theory
The name Organization and Management Theory serves to represent an 
enormous body of  theoretical and empirical research that has taken 
place over the past century. At its core, OMT involves the activities 
organizing and managing, which we characterize here as follows. 
Drawing from both rational and natural definitions (Scott 2003), 
organizing involves establishing the manner in which participants 
in a collective (e.g., people, groups, organizations) work toward the 
accomplishment of  (at least partially) shared objectives. Managing 
involves coordinating the activities (e.g., decision making, informa-
tion sharing, working) of  such participants.
Here we summarize the key OMT concepts from Contingency 
Theory, which provides a highly relevant basis for comparison with 
the concepts from the C2 literature identified above. We then draw 
from important OMT work on organizational archetypes to identify 
a useful set of  organizing and managing variables for comparison 
with C2 variables. We complete this section by using such OMT 
concepts and variables to specify several organizational archetypes 
for comparison with the field of  C2.
It is important to understand that this literature goes well beyond 
theoretical description. Despite the word “theory” in its title, the 
Contingency Theory literature includes an enormous amount of  
empirical research that demonstrates the practical application of  
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such theory to improve the performance of  operational organiza-
tions in the field. Although describing specific examples is beyond 
the scope of  this paper, the interested reader is directed to the refer-
ences cited below to such empirical literature.
Contingency Theory
Within the enormous body of  OMT literature, the Contingency 
Theory (CT) subfield emerges as the most relevant for compari-
son and integration with C2 (Nissen 2007): CT involves purposeful 
design and change of  organizations to fit their environments and 
other contingencies (e.g., strategies, technologies, people). Such pur-
poseful design and change reflects a fundamentally rational, teleo-
logical view of  organizing and managing, a view which is ascribed 
widely to those involved with C2.
Further, for more than a half  century, Contingency Theory has 
retained a central place in organization and management research. 
Beginning with seminal works by Burns and Stalker (1961), 
Woodward (1965), and Lawrence and Lorsch (1967), Organization 
and Management Theory has been guided by the understanding 
that no single approach to organizing is best in all circumstances.
Moreover, myriad empirical studies (e.g., Argote 1982; Donaldson 
1987; Hamilton and Shergill 1992; Keller 1994; cf., Mohr 1971; 
Pennings 1975) have confirmed and reconfirmed that poor orga-
nizational fit degrades performance. Moreover, many diverse orga-
nizational structures (e.g., Functional, Decentralized, Mixed, see 
Duncan 1979), forms (e.g., Bureaucracy, see Weber and Parsons 
1947; M-Form, see Chandler 1962; Network, see Miles and Snow 
1978; Clan, see Ouchi 1980; 1981; Virtual, see Davidow and 
Malone 1992; Platform, see Ciborra 1996), configurations (e.g., 
Machine Bureaucracy, Simple Structure, Professional Bureaucracy, 
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Divisionalized Form, Adhocracy, see Mintzberg 1979), and other 
groupings14 have been theorized to enhance fit across an array of  con-
tingency factors (e.g., age, environment, size, strategy, technology).
Indeed, organization and management scholars have come to 
understand well how various organizational forms are and should 
be designed and changed to fit specific contingency contexts. For 
instance, organizational technology has been studied extensively as 
a powerful contingency factor (e.g., Litwak 1961; Woodward 1965; 
Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, and Turner 1969), with alternate techno-
logical characteristics (e.g., task variability, problem analyzability) 
related contingently to different organizational forms (e.g., Craft, 
Engineering, see Perrow 1970). As another instance, organizational 
environment has also been studied extensively as a powerful contin-
gency factor (e.g., Burns and Stalker 1961; Harvey 1968; Galbraith 
1973; 1977), with alternate environmental characteristics (e.g., 
complexity, change) related contingently to different organizational 
structures (e.g., Functional, Decentralized, see Duncan 1979).
Organizational Archetypes
We draw from Mintzberg’s work on organizational archetypes 
(Mintzberg 1979) and build upon detailed specifications15 to char-
acterize such archetypes in terms of  OMT concepts and variables 
14. As a note, although we recognize differences in meaning between terms such 
as organizational structure, form, configuration and others (e.g., see Doty et al. 1993; 
Meyer et al. 1993; Morrison and Roth 1993; Snow et al. 2005; Payne 2006), 
unless the specific meaning is important to our argument. In this article we use 
them interchangeably for the most part.
15. This follows prior work (Orr and Nissen 2006) to specify organizational 
archetypes with sufficient precision for representation via computational models. 
Such specification requires making several assumptions regarding Mintzberg’s 
variables, but makes the meaning of  each variable comparatively precise, 
particularly with respect to natural-language description comprising the majority 
of  the OMT (and C2) literature(s).
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that can be mapped to many of  those from the C2 domain iden-
tified above. Examining archetypes is very useful, for each repre-
sents a class of  organization and, hence, describes a broad array of  
organizational instances. Indeed, Mintzberg proposes that almost all 
organizations can be described by only five organizational arche-
types: 1) Simple Structure, 2) Machine Bureaucracy, 3) Professional 
Bureaucracy, 4) Divisionalized Form, and 5) Adhocracy. Each 
approach to organizing can be characterized in terms of  five ele-
ments: 1) operating core, 2) strategic apex, 3) middle line, 4) techno-
structure, and 5) support staff. Each approach to managing can be 
characterized in terms of  five coordination mechanisms: 1) mutual 
adjustment, 2) direct supervision and standardization of  3) work 











Organizational Elements and Coordination Mechanisms
Drawing heavily from (Nissen 2005), Figure 6 summarizes these 
organizational elements. The basic elements are shown in the 
upper- left quadrant. The strategic apex is shown as a circle at the top 
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of  the organization. This is where strategic organization, manage-
ment, and leadership are accomplished in most views of  organizing 
and managing. The middle line is shown as a square below the apex. 
This is where line organization, management, and leadership take 
place. The operating core is shown immediately below the middle. This 
is where the basic product and service outputs of  the organization 
are accomplished. On either side of  the middle line are the techno-
structure and support staff. Like the middle line, these two elements 
sit between the strategic apex and the operating core, but as staff  
organizations they are not part of  the direct line between the apex 
and core. The technostructure is responsible for direct support such 
as planning, analysis, and technology. The support staff  is respon-
sible for indirect functions such as accounting, legal counsel, and 
building maintenance.
Different organizational archetypes can be depicted and differen-
tiated graphically using these elements. For instance, the Simple 
Structure (labeled “Simple: direct supervision”) is depicted in the 
upper-right quadrant. It includes only two of  the five elements: 1) 
strategic apex and 2) operating core. The strategic apex is empha-
sized by making it prominent. In this archetype, coordination is 
attained principally through direct supervision. Most very small 
businesses are organized in this way.
In contrast, the Machine Bureaucracy (labeled “Machine: work 
std”) is depicted in the lower-left quadrant. It includes all five ele-
ments, with three elements emphasized by making them promi-
nent. Specifically, the middle line is depicted using a relatively large 
square, and both the technostructure and support staff  are depicted 
similarly using relatively large circles. This depiction represents the 
relatively large numbers of  layers of  middle management and rela-
tively large size and influence of  technical and support staffs. In this 
archetype, coordination is attained largely through standardization 
of  work processes. Most large firms, military commands, and gov-
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ernment agencies organize along these lines. Indeed, the C2 term 
hierarchy corresponds very closely with this Machine Bureaucracy 
archetype (Nissen 2005).
A third instance includes the Professional Bureaucracy (labeled 
“Professional: skills std”), which is depicted in the lower-right quad-
rant. It includes all five elements also, but both the operating core 
and support staff  are emphasized by making them prominent. Here 
standardization of  skills provides the principal means of  coordina-
tion among professionals in the operating core. Most professional 
corporations (e.g., legal firms, medical offices, consultancies) orga-
nize this way.
A fourth instance includes the Adhocracy (labeled “Adhocracy: 
adjustment”), which is depicted in the center. It includes all five ele-
ments also, but they are blended together to depict much less struc-
ture and differentiation than is present in the other archetypes. Here 
mutual adjustment provides the principal means of  coordination. 
Many new firms, agencies, and organizations (e.g., startup firms, 
innovation-oriented companies, non-profit groups) are organized as 
loosely structured Adhocracies.







It is important to understand that these organizational elements and 
coordination mechanisms can be put together in many different 
ways and that they can change dynamically. For instance, the Edge 
organization (Alberts and Hayes 2003) integrates aspects of  multiple 
archetypes. Like the Simple Structure, it reflects low specialization; 
like the Professional Bureaucracy, it reflects a prominent operating 
core; and like the Adhocracy, it involves coordination via mutual 
adjustment. However, it lacks the other organizational elements. 
Indeed, the Edge can be viewed as a hybrid archetype, yet it appears 
to be distinct (Gateau, Leweling, Looney, and Nissen 2007; Orr and 
Nissen 2006) in that only an operating core is involved. Leadership 
is emergent in the Edge meritocracy environment, which we depict 
by different dotted circles (e.g., corresponding to different leaders 
emerging at various times) extending only partially from the operat-
ing core in Figure 7, which we include along with the three arche-
types from which it draws greatly.
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We should note at this point that Mintzberg published a consider-
able volume of  scholarly work beyond the discussion of  archetypes 
summarized above (e.g., managerial work, Mintzberg 1973, orga-
nizational power, Mintzberg 1983, strategy, Mintzberg 1991, and 
others). Indeed, even in the work cited above (479-480) he proposes 
a sixth archetype called the Missionary Configuration, which would 
use standardization of  norms as the primary manner of  coordina-
tion and would stress indoctrination as the principal design factor.
In addition to using the organizational elements and coordination 
mechanisms for classification and depiction, Mintzberg introduces 
eight variables associated with organizing and managing, what he 
terms design factors, to specify and contrast the archetypes. Such vari-
ables enable us to be more precise in terms of  specifying the differ-
ent archetypes and provide a basis for interrelating them with key 
concepts and variables from the C2 field.
Table 1 summarizes the archetype variables. Centralization pertains to 
the breadth of  decision rights. Specialization refers to the division of  
labor and includes two dimensions: 1) vertical refers to the limited-
ness of  job control, and 2) horizontal refers to the narrowness of  job 
breadth. The greater the vertical or horizontal specialization, the 
less the job control or breadth, respectively. Formalization represents 
the extent to which work processes are specified formally (e.g., via 
rules, policy manuals, written procedures, job instructions). Liaison 
devices involve means of  horizontal interaction (e.g., between func-
tions) and can include approaches such as informal exchanges, task 
teams and matrix organizations. Planning and control refers to how 
outputs are managed. This includes action planning or performance 
control. Although planning and control represent complementary 
variables, we discuss these two together to mirror Mintzberg’s origi-
nal presentation.
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Table 1. Archetype Variables
Design Factor Meaning 
Centralization Breadth of decision rights 
Vertical specialization Limitedness of job control  
Horizontal specialization  Narrowness of job breadth 
Formalization Formalization of work processes 
Liaison devices Means of horizontal interaction 
Planning & control Management of outputs 
Training  Formal education & training 
Indoctrination Intensity of acculturation & norming 
Unit grouping Composition of organizational units 
Unit size Span of control 
Training and indoctrination can be split into two subfactors. Training 
involves the degree of  formal education and training organiza-
tional participants receive (usually in advance of  beginning a job). 
Indoctrination involves the intensity of  acculturation and norming 
forces associated with an organization. Unit grouping refers to how 
organizational units are composed. This can be by function (e.g., 
skill, knowledge, business process) or market (e.g., product, geog-
raphy, demographic). Finally, unit size refers to managerial span of  
control. With these design factors, we have the ability to charac-
terize a broad diversity of  organizational instances through arche-
types as well as a set of  variables to both specify and contrast diverse 
instances.
Specifying Organizational Archetypes
Using the concepts and OMT variables from Table 1, we can specify 
each of  the five organizational archetypes (i.e., Machine Bureaucracy, 
Simple Structure, Professional Bureaucracy, Adhocracy, Edge).
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Bureaucracy Adhocracy Edge 
Centralization High High Low Low Low 
Vertical 
Specialization 
High High Low Low Low 
Horizontal 
Specialization 
High Low High High Low 
      
Formalization High Low Low Low Low 
Liaison 
Devices 




Action Planning Little Little Some Action Performance 
Control 
Table 2 contains the OMT variable values for each of  the arche-
types,  thus constituting a specification. For instance, Column 2 
summarizes specifications of  the Machine Bureaucracy and reflects 
its high centralization, specialization, and formalization levels. 
The other variables and levels follow accordingly for the Machine 
Bureaucracy and other archetypes. In addition to relatively extreme 
labels (esp. “high” and “low”), we include some intermediate values 
(e.g., “some” and “little”) to suggest that certain archetypes and vari-
ables are not characterized by such extreme values.
Conceptual Integration
In this section we identify how the C2 and OMT concepts and vari-
ables map to each other. This provides the basis for the development 
of  a metaphorical Rosetta Stone for interpretation and comparison 
across these two fields. Table 3 includes a set of  variables across the 
C2 and OMT literatures that appear to match in part. These C2 
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variables derived from the C2 Approach Space include: allocation of  
decision rights, patterns of  interaction, and distribution of  information (Alberts 
and Hayes 2006). The OMT variables were derived from Mintzberg 
(1979). Notice that not all of  the OMT variables from Table 1 have 
been included. This suggests that our effort to harmonize C2 and 
OMT remains only partially accomplished at this point. We address 
the correspondences between and among these variables and then 
present some additional C2 variables briefly for reference.
Table 3. Partially Matching Variables across Domains
C2 Variable OMT Variable 
Allocation of Decision Rights   
Centralization  
Vertical Specialization  
Horizontal Specialization  
  
Patterns of Interaction  
Formalization  
Liaison Devices  
Planning & Control Systems  
  
Distribution of Information  
Liaison Devices  
Planning & Control Systems  
Allocation of  Decision Rights (ADR)
The OMT variable centralization appears to be a good match with 
allocation of  decision rights (ADR). In terms of  the ADR continuum 
ranging from none to broad, the former corresponds closely to a 
highly centralized authority, while the latter corresponds to a decen-
tralized organization. The OMT variables related to specialization 
also seem to map to ADR. When there is a lack of  specialization, 
that is, if  individuals and/or entities can decide for themselves what 
to focus on and what tasks to undertake, this maps to an ADR value 
of  “broad.”
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On the other hand, to the extent that formal specialization occurs 
(moving along the axis toward “none”), then it would be expected 
that those decision rights associated with each area of  specializa-
tion would only be associated with specialists. Vertical specialization, to 
the extent it exists, limits job control; that is, the greater the vertical 
specialization, the less control individual actors have over their job 
duties and vice versa. Horizontal specialization pertains to narrow job 
breadth; that is, the greater the horizontal specialization, the lesser 
breadth associated with individual’s jobs and vice versa. Narrow and 
broad degrees of  specialization correspond, respectively, with con-
strained and unconstrained patterns of  interaction. That is, people 
who lack much breadth in their job duties tend to have restricted 
patterns of  interaction and vice versa.
The classic hierarchy, Machine Bureaucracy archetype exhibits high 
centralization, vertical and horizontal specialization. Alternatively, 
the novel, flat, Edge archetype (by definition a decentralized entity) 
has, in the ongoing series of  experiments using the ELICIT environ-
ment, consistently exhibited relative lack of  vertical and horizontal 
specialization when compared to the behaviors recorded for The 
Hierarchy experimental treatment.
The remaining discussion of  the correspondences between and 
among C2 Approach Space dimensions and selected OMT vari-
ables are empirically informed by the results of  a series of  interna-
tional experiments.16
Patterns of  Interaction (PoI)
The extent of  specialization (a property associated with ADR) 
directly affects the PoI. Narrow and broad degrees of  specializa-
tion correspond, respectively, with constrained and unconstrained 
16. See http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/elicit.html for links to some of  the 
papers that discuss these experiments.
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patterns of  interaction. That is, people who are unconstrained with 
respect to their job duties tend to have less restricted patterns of  
interaction and vice versa.
Three OMT variables seem to map reasonably well to PoI, char-
acterized along a continuum ranging from tightly constrained to 
unconstrained. Formalization characterizes the extent to which work 
processes are specified formally (e.g., via rules, policy manuals, writ-
ten procedures, job instructions). High and low degrees of  formal-
ization correspond, respectively, with constrained and unconstrained 
patterns of  interaction. That is, people who have highly formalized 
job duties tend to have more restricted patterns of  interaction and 
vice versa.
Liaison devices pertain to means of  horizontal interaction (e.g., 
between functions) and can include approaches limited to the stra-
tegic apex, informal exchanges, task teams and matrix organiza-
tions. Organizations with liaison devices limited to the strategic 
apex exhibit behaviors that correspond with constrained patterns 
of  interaction. That is, people who work in organizations with no 
or very limited liaison devices tend to interact with a more limited 
set of  individuals and organizations than those who have richer 
opportunities to interact, provided the ADR does not interfere with 
these opportunities. Alternatively, organizations with liaison devices 
extending through task teams and matrix organizations correspond 
to less constrained patterns of  interaction.
Planning and control systems characterize how outputs can be man-
aged through employing performance control, by action planning, 
or both. The more that organizations manage outputs through 
action planning (e.g., specific and detailed plans), the more their pat-
terns of  interaction tend to be constrained (e.g., prescribing exactly 
which interactions will take place). The more that such outputs 
are managed via control of  performance (e.g., outlining high-level 
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results to be achieved), the less their patterns of  interaction tend 
to be constrained (e.g., allowing for spontaneous and unanticipated 
interactions in addition to those that are ordinary and expected).
The Machine Bureaucracy archetype is an embodiment of  high 
formalization, liaison devices are informal and limited to the apex. 
Planning and control systems are centered on action planning. 
Alternatively, the Edge archetype exhibits low formalization, liaison 
devices extending to teams and matrix organizations, and planning 
and control systems centered on performance control.
Distribution of  Information (DoI)
One of  the most significant consequences of  ADR and PoI is the 
extent to which information is distributed. DoI can range from none 
to broad. The OMT variables most closely associated with distribu-
tion of  information are liaison devices and planning and control systems. 
Organizations with few or relatively ineffective liaison mechanisms 
and output-managing control systems tend to maintain tight control 
over distribution of  information and result in limited information 
being disseminated to limited audiences and vice versa. As noted 
above, the Machine Bureaucracy archetype, because it employs liai-
son devices limited to the apex and informal, and planning and con-
trol systems that center on action planning, can be expected to result 
in information that is narrowly disseminated. Alternatively, the Edge 
archetype, employing liaison devices extending to teams and matrix 
organizations, and utilizing planning and control systems that center 
on performance control, can be expected to disseminate informa-
tion more widely.
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Additional Variables
There are myriad additional variables from the C2 and OMT 
domains identified in the literatures of  these domains, but their 
mapping for our present purposes is more difficult or less informa-
tive. For instance, Table 4 lists a sample of  other significant variables 
from the C2 domain along with their meanings (SAS-050 2006; 
SAS-065 2008). The OMT variables outlined by Mintzberg do not 
correspond well with the C2 counterparts in this set.
Table 4. Sample of  Additional C2 Variables
Variable Meaning 
C2 system performance 
How well computer, network, and other information systems perform 
in support of commanders’ needs 
Information quality 
The accuracy, completeness, consistency, correctness, currency, 
precision, relevance, timeliness, uncertainty, service characteristics, 
sharability, and source characteristics of information 
Decision quality 
How well commanders and others make decisions, given the quality of 
information 
Shared awareness 
The accuracy, completeness, consistency, correctness, currency, 
precision, relevance, timeliness, and uncertainty of shared awareness 
Self-synchronization 
The capability of operating-level forces to organization themselves and 
coordinate their time-dependent activities without hierarchical input 
Agility 
The ability to successfully cope with a variety of circumstances and 
stresses agile organizations are robust, flexible, responsive, innovative, 
resilient, and adaptive 
Maturity 
The capability of organizations to enable each of five NNEC 
operational capability levels: 1) Conflicted C2 enables standalone 
(disjoint) operations; 2) De-Conflicted enables De-Conflicted 
operations; 3) Coordinated C2 enables coordinated operations; 4) 
Collaborative C2 enables integrated operations; and 5) Edge C2 
enables transformed (coherent) operations 
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Rosetta Stone
The relationships between the C2 and OMT variables discussed 
above provide a reasonable basis to outline a preliminary, metaphor-
ical Rosetta Stone. This Rosetta Stone will facilitate efforts to relate 
some of  the key variables from the C2 and OMT literatures to each 
other and both of  these sets to a common approach space. The first 
step in the development of  the Rosetta Stone is to map the OMT 
archetypes as shown along the top of  the chart into the three sets of  
OMT variables that correspond to each of  the C2 Approach dimen-
sion variables.
In Table 5, the OMT variables are mapped simply to the C2 
Approach variables according to the scheme presented in Table 3. 
Looking at the Machine Bureaucracy archetype, for instance, we 
have high centralization, vertical specialization, and horizontal spe-
cialization. Together, these three high levels suggest unitary decision 
rights allocation. Likewise for patterns of  interaction: high formal-
ization, few liaison devices, and focus on action planning suggest 
constrained patterns of  interaction. Similarly for distribution of  
information: few liaison devices and focus on action planning sug-
gest tightly controlled distribution of  information. The same kind of  
reasoning applies to the scaling of  the other four archetypes. Notice 
the contrast between Machine Bureaucracy and Edge. This is con-
sistent with prior research in both C2 (Alberts and Hayes 2006) and 
OMT (Nissen 2005).
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Bureaucracy Adhocracy Edge 




Specialization High High Low Low Low 
 
Horizontal 
Specialization High Low High High Low 
       
Formalization High Low Low Low Low 
Patterns of 
Interaction Liaison 





Action Planning Little  Little Some Action 
Performance 
Control 
       
Liaison 
Devices Few Few Some Many Many 
Distribution 
of 
Information Planning & 
Control 
Systems 
Action Planning Little Little Some Action 
Performance 
Control 
Table 6 depicts the direct mapping of  OMT archetypes to C2 
Approach variables. We include several intermediate values for 
each dimension to reflect the multiple OMT variables by each C2 
Approach dimension. Examining the Simple Structure for instance, 
like the Machine Bureaucracy, we have high centralization and high 
vertical specialization associated with the C2 Approach dimension 
allocation of  decision rights, but unlike the Machine Bureaucracy, the 
Simple Structure has low horizontal specialization. This suggests 
that the allocation of  decision rights is mostly unitary but not as 
much so as with the Machine Bureaucracy. Hence we include the 
label “mostly unitary” in Table 6. The same reasoning applies to the 
“mostly constrained” label for patterns of  interaction, the “mostly 
controlled” label for distribution of  information for the Simple 
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Structure, and the other intermediate labels associated with the 
Professional Bureaucracy and Adhocracy. Notice, alternatively, how 
the Edge archetype does not necessitate such intermediate labels; 
that is, it reflects peer-to-peer (P2P) allocation of  decision rights, 
unconstrained patterns of  interaction, and broad dissemination of  
information.
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Balanced Mostly Broad Broad 
Figure 8 shows each of  the five archetypes anchored with “no orga-
nization” positioned within the C2 Approach Space. As a point of  
reference, “no organization” is plotted at Point A (values none, none, 
none). Machine Bureaucracy is placed not far away in the lower left 
frontal area of  the diagram, reflecting unitary allocation of  decision 
rights, constrained patterns of  interaction, and controlled distribu-
tion of  information. In contrast, the Edge is plotted in the upper 
right rear corner of  the diagram (Point H), reflecting P2P allocation 
of  decision rights, unconstrained patterns of  interaction, and broad 
distribution of  information. The Simple Structure, Professional 
Bureaucracy, and Adhocracy are plotted in the same manner.






















OMT Archetypes in the C2 Approach Space
Notice how these latter three archetypes reflect something of  inter-
mediate positions within the C2 Approach Space with plot points 
that are not as extreme as those positioning the Machine Bureaucracy 
and Edge. More precisely, whereas the Machine Bureaucracy and 
Edge plot at opposite corners of  the space, the other archetypes 
plot at different points within the space. The Simple Structure plots 
relatively close to the Machine Bureaucracy and the Professional 
Bureaucracy and Adhocracy plot relatively closer to the Edge. This 
provides us with visual representation of  alternate organizational 
forms and how they relate to different C2 Approaches.
Notice further how most of  the corners depicted in the C2 Approach 
Space do not have archetypes plotted at them. Indeed, aside from 
the corners corresponding to the Machine Bureaucracy (Point A) 
and Edge (Point H), all other vertices are empty and labeled simply 
with a capital letter to identify them. For instance, in contrast with 
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the Machine Bureaucracy, Corner B reflects P2P decision rights 
allocation, but is consistent in terms of  constrained patterns of  inter-
action and controlled distribution of  information. It is unclear how a 
corresponding organizational form would reflect this C2 Approach, 
but the figure suggests that such form and approach are possible 
in theory. In this sense, the diagram represents something of  a C2 
Approach generator: the various vertices, edges, planes, and points 
within the space all represent theoretically possible C2 Approaches 
with corresponding organizational forms. Identifying, understand-
ing, and comparing such forms represents a fascinating topic for 
future research, as does empirical comparison and contrast with 
operational C2 organizations in the field.
OMT and C2 Archetypes
within a Common Approach Space
The ability to map both the OMT and C2 Approach archetypes 
onto the same approach space enables comparisons in a way that 
was not previously possible. This will also facilitate parallel explora-
tion of  the Approach Space and the implications of  different regions 
within this space by researchers from both communities. Figure 9 
depicts a correspondence between the scales developed for the C2 
Approaches and the OMT archetypes. This is essentially a repro-
duction of  the scale depicted above with an overlay of  the OMT 
archetypes as summarized in Table 6.
For instance, “Conflicted C2” is plotted on the left of  the top scale 
(i.e., with no allocation of  decision rights) and corresponds with 
the “No Organization” OMT archetype plotted at the same point 
on the scale. Similarly, The De-Conflicted C2 Approach plots as a 
range toward the left end of  this same scale, and the OMT Machine 
Bureaucracy archetype plots within this range (i.e., unitary allocation 
of  decision rights). The same applies to the other C2 Approaches 
44       The International C2 Journal | Vol 3, No 2
and OMT archetypes across the three scales. This overlay enables 






































































Combi ned C2 and OMT Approach Scales
Such depiction in a common approach space is presented in Figure 
10. Immediately one can see that the OMT archetypes map to areas 
that are adjacent to or, in part, overlap C2 archetypes. As above, 
Conflicted C2 corresponds to No Organization. The mapping is pre-
cise and the concepts synonymous. Machine Bureaucracy abuts both 
De-Conflicted C2 and Coordinated C2. The Machine Bureaucracy 
appears to bridge the two C2 Approaches. Simple Structure falls 
within Coordinated C2. The archetypes reflect considerable balance 
across all three dimensions. Adhocracy abuts Edge C2, and Edge sits 
at the opposite corner of  the Edge C2 Approach. Adhocracy and 
Edge define two extremes of  the Edge approach.




























OMT and C2 Archetypes in a Common Approach Space
The theories that underpin the C2 Approaches and the OMT 
archetypes are totally independent and come from observing dif-
ferent types of  organizations engaged in very different endeavors. 
Nonetheless, through this Rosetta Stone we are able to interrelate 
them clearly and directly through a common set of  dimensions 
and scales. Furthermore the two perspectives are different. The C2 
Approaches were developed for both standing military organizations 
and collectives involving both militaries and civilian organizations 
with no a priori structure. The OMT archetypes were idealized from 
observed civil organizations. This represents a substantial theoretic 
contribution to both the C2 and OMT literatures. Future research 
in this area will undoubtedly involve attempts to develop quantitative 
measures of  these three dimensions of  the approach space, obtain 
data empirically. As a result, the regions of  this approach space will 
be refined.
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Practical Illustration
As part of  its efforts to validate the conceptual model of  C2 Maturity, 
the SAS-065 Research Task Group undertook a number of  case 
studies, simulations, and analyses of  available experimental data. 
They wanted to determine if  this model could be usefully applied to 
structure C2-related problems, develop lessons learned from opera-
tions, design experiments, and the like. We build upon this work to 
illustrate how our conceptual integration applies to organizations 
and C2 Approaches in practice as well as to theory.
For instance, using data collected and analyzed in the case (SAS-065 
2008), we interpret one case pertaining to air operations in the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR). Based upon the case as secondary data, the 
C2 Approach to this operation plots roughly as depicted in Figure 
11. Notice that it does not fall neatly within any of  the C2 archetypes 
depicted in the figure or described above. Two of  the three dimen-
sions correspond to Coordinated C2, while the third dimension 
corresponds to De-Conflicted C2. Hence the KFOR C2 Approach 
represents something of  a hybrid between Coordinated and 
De-Conflicted C2. This illustrates how our theoretical C2 arche-
types can be used to depict and classify operational C2 Approaches 
in the field, but such operational approaches need not correspond to 
only a single archetype. This result mirrors the long-standing under-
standing in the OMT literature that operational organizations in 
practice can represent hybrids of  any two or more OMT archetypes.
Interestingly, the OMT archetype Machine Bureaucracy maps 
more closely to the KFOR Air Case in the C2 Approach Space than 
any of  the archetypical C2 Approaches. Given that the Machine 
Bureaucracy is noted to correspond well to most contemporary 
military organizations (Gateau, Leweling, Looney, and Nissen 2007; 
Looney and Nissen 2006; Nissen 2005), this result is easy to interpret, 
namely that KFOR Air has the characteristics of  a typical Industrial 
Age military organization.
























The ability of  our Rosetta Stone to combine theory from both the 
C2 and OMT fields demonstrates a strong theoretical contribution. 
Its ability to depict operational C2 Approaches and military orga-
nizations in the field provides a measure of  external validity and 
practical applicability of  the approach. Of  course, this represents 
only the first step. Many other C2 Approaches, military, and other 
organizations need to be analyzed in similar fashion, but now both 
the C2 and OMT communities have an approach to doing so and to 
sharing their results with one another.
Conclusion
A variety of  academic disciplines and professional organizations 
address how collections of  individuals and organizations combine 
their individual resources and efforts to accomplish collective objec-
tives. However, these largely disjointed communities of  researchers 
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and practitioners have developed their own concepts, models, and 
languages. They focus on different yet complementary issues, levels 
of  analysis, sets of  variables, and like aspects of  research. Addressing 
recent calls in the literature for increased semantic interoperability 
and interaction across these communities, we build upon current 
work focused on bridging communities through concepts from the 
fields of  command and control and contingency theory. We develop 
multidisciplinary formulations of  the C2 Approach Space and the 
concept C2 Maturity.
In particular, we summarize the key concepts and variables in both 
the C2 and organization and management literatures and use the 
increasingly well-understood contrast between hierarchical and edge 
approaches to C2, and the corresponding organization and manage-
ment structures, to give such concepts and variables concrete appli-
cation. We then develop a metaphorical Rosetta Stone, in the form 
of  a common approach space and use the concept of  C2 Maturity 
to interrelate such concepts and variables across domains.
Results of  mapping such concepts and variables across the two 
fields of  study reveals considerable correspondence. We show how 
a variety of  C2 Approach archetypes and organizational archetypes 
can be examined together within a concise set of  three dimensions. 
Moreover, we illustrate how such diverse archetypes can be visu-
alized together in terms of  this same, three-dimensional model. 
This represents a substantial theoretic contribution to both the C2 
and OMT domains. Further, we demonstrate how this theoretical 
model, our metaphorical Rosetta Stone, has practical application by 
examining how an operational C2 Approach observed in the field 
can be mapped to the model and compared to archetypes from both 
domains. This illustrates how our conceptual integration applies to 
organizations and C2 Approaches in practice as well as to theory.
We also document the fact that there are a number of  variables 
considered important by the C2 community that do not seem to 
have a corresponding OMT variable. This conclusion argues for a 
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set of  cross-domain research initiatives that are focused on a better 
understanding of  these variables in the context of  a variety of  orga-
nizations and collectives.
Thus, with such development of  a common approach space, one 
that can be used to describe both a variety of  C2 Approaches 
(e.g., including C2 Approach archetypes, approaches observed in 
actual operations, and experimental approaches) and a variety of  
approaches to OMT (e.g., including OMT archetypes, observed 
organizational behaviors, and organizational treatments), we have 
taken the first step toward building a conceptual bridge between 
these two communities.
Indeed, apparently for the first time, C2 researchers can describe 
various C2 Approaches to OMT researchers and relate such 
approaches to organizational archetypes. Likewise, and again, 
apparently for the first time, OMT researchers can describe various 
organizational archetypes to C2 researchers and relate such arche-
types to C2 Approaches. With this, we facilitate richer and broader 
interaction between these traditionally disconnected research disci-
plines. We also move the state of  C2 research out of  its stereotypical, 
conflicted behavior.
Table 7. Key Ch allenges
Challenges 
Developing Improved Scales for the Dimensions of the Approach Space 
Operationalizing Agility 
Exploring Edge Approaches and Other Relatively Unexplored Regions of the Approach Space 
Exploring the Relationships Between the Collective C2 Maturity and Entity C2-OMT Approach 
Maturity 
Understanding Requite Maturity and Agility 
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However, much work remains to be done to enable potential syn-
ergies between these two and related disciplines. To conclude this 
section, we identify the five interrelated research challenges (sum-
marized in Table 7) that we believe deserve priority attention. The 
first two address fundamental issues of  definition and measurement. 
Development of  the scales for the OMT archetypes results in an 
ordinal arrangement that mirrors theory but leaves many important 
aspects underspecified. Moreover, those developed for the C2 arche-
types—although reflecting interval scales developed through expert 
judgment—leave a great deal of  room for elaboration and preci-
sion. Likewise, the concept of  agility is both intuitively and theo-
retically appealing, but it remains difficult to operationalize. Indeed, 
this compound concept is comprised of  six underlying concepts 
(e.g., robustness, resilience, flexibility), which themselves remain 
difficult to operationalize. Improvements in these areas are needed 
to enhance rigor and to explore new ways more systematically for 
accomplishing the processes that we associate with C2, organization, 
management, and governance.
The other three challenges involve fleshing out our understanding 
of  the various regions in the combined approach space, their contin-
gent appropriateness as a function of  circumstances, and the costs 
and benefits of  more mature approaches such as edge or edge-like 
organization/C2. Theoretical work is needed to understand the 
implications of  the myriad corners, edges, planes, and points in the 
approach space that do not have archetypes mapped to them. Some 
of  these may offer promise in terms of  outlining currently unknown 
C2 Approaches and organizations that are appropriate for certain 
mission-environmental contexts. In this sense, the approach space 
can serve as a generator of  new approaches and organizations.
Likewise, the concept Maturity offers good potential for description, 
explanation, and possibly even prescription. However, we need to 
explore how the maturity of  collectives (e.g., coalitions) interrelates 
with that of  single entities (e.g., organizations). The related concept 
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requisite maturity17 suggests that, in a contingency theoretical way, 
higher maturity may not be “better” in all cases. Given that higher 
maturity levels are likely to be more difficult and costly to attain, lev-
els that are too high for a particular mission-environmental context 
may be counterproductive. We are only beginning to formulate the 
appropriate research questions to address these challenges. Much 
research remains to be conducted. However, with this conceptual 
integration, hopefully we can engage in such research through the 
combined and integrated efforts of  the C2 and OMT communities.
17. Requisite maturity refers to the level of  C2 Maturity that is required to deal 
with the situation at hand.
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